1. Introduction

Authoritarian regimes cast a long shadow over citizens, lingering even after their collapse. Enduring legacies significantly influence the cultivation of a democratic political culture in countries undergoing democratic transitions and even established democracies. Authoritarian nostalgia becomes one of the obstacles to the consolidation of democracy.¹Sjoerd de Leeuw, Roderik Rekker, Rachid Azrout and Joost van Spanje, “A Matter of Nostalgia: How Authoritarian Traditions Shape the Distribution of Democratic Support on the Left-Right Dimension,” paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), 2018. This phenomenon is broadly defined as a longing for the authoritarian past. It seems to indicate more than a mere sentimental longing for the "good old days;" it also reflects how political, economic, and social dissatisfaction with the present opens the possibility for backsliding under precarious democratic transition.

In Tunisia, the authoritarian past creeps in as an object of nostalgic longing by both ordinary people and political elites. On the one hand, it has been observed that political parties and figures are returning to embrace Bourguiba's "modernist" legacy and idealizing Ben Ali's economic "miracle." Some political actors associated with the past regime became viable and even acceptable electoral options. Amid a new democracy grappling with economic crisis and political instability, some political actors have leveraged authoritarian nostalgia to legitimize their agendas, gain voters' trust, and secure access to power. On the other hand, the older generations have been expressing sentiments of nostalgia. Many of them tend to share assessments of the former dictatorship that often emphasize its achievements over its autocratic repression. This seems to confirm the longstanding literature on political socialization that shows higher nostalgia among individuals who grew up under authoritarianism.²Natasha Lindstaedt, Democratic Decay and Authoritarian Resurgence. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press, 2021.

Yet, curiously, this authoritarian nostalgia is not limited just to older Tunisians. Indeed, in research conducted by the Arab Reform Initiative on the political socialization of youth who grew up during or even after the 2011 revolution,³See Malek Lakhal and Nadia Jmal, “Tunisian Youth Perceptions of Authoritarian Restoration: Withering Support to Democracy”, Arab Reform Initiative, April 2024, available at https://ari26.arabregionhub.net/publication/tunisian-youth-perceptions-of-authoritarian-restoration-withering-support-to-democracy/ (Lakhal and Jmal, Tunisian Youth Perceptions ) one of the most surprising findings is a growing nostalgia for the Ben Ali regime era—a fondness for a past period that most of them did not personally witness, which they characterize as emblematic of "Amn w Amen" (safety and security), "ist9rar" (stability) and "Haybet el Dawla," (evocative of the nation's prestigious status). These findings may suggest that the affective impact of authoritarian regimes is long-lasting and will not simply disappear as new generations replace the old.

Amidst the current democratic backsliding in Tunisia, we are witnessing a disturbing resurgence of familiar authoritarian practices, with ongoing repression targeting activists, politicians, journalists, and civil society actors. This raises the urgent need to explore the roots of authoritarian nostalgia, particularly its connection to the country's failure to adequately confront and address the roots of authoritarianism. This paper will argue that authoritarian nostalgia stems from the shortcomings of an unclear break from the practices and politics of the dictatorship era. Furthermore, the persistent presence of authoritarian nostalgia can be attributed to the inability to condemn the legacy of authoritarianism and the lack of awareness of the country’s brutal history. A meaningful transitional justice process was not fully carried out, for various political and structural reasons, and this setback has allowed authoritarian nostalgia to persist.

To explore how this fantasy persists in times of democratic transition, the paper begins by examining the concept of authoritarian nostalgia among the so-called Third-Wave Democracies.⁴The Third Wave of Democratization refers to the global trend towards democracy that began in the mid-20th century, particularly after the end of the Cold War. It began with the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the late-1970s Spanish transition to democracy. This was followed by the historic democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s, Asia-Pacific countries (Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan) from 1986 to 1988, Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and sub-Saharan Africa, beginning in 1989. Next, it situates the latter within the Tunisian context. The following section then investigates how the legacy of authoritarianism continues to be leveraged in the political arena, shaping both political dynamics and agendas. The final part addresses the shortcomings of Tunisia's transitional justice process, particularly how the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) missed a crucial opportunity to raise awareness and build momentum among the general public, particularly the youth. The essay concludes with a reflection on the enduring presence of authoritarian nostalgia.

2. Authoritarian Nostalgia and Third-Wave Democracies: An Overview

Citizens experience collective nostalgia for specific political eras in the past, often delineated by significant historical events, such as transitions in administration, elections, or regime changes to a new political system.⁵Sanghoon Kim, "Voting for Nostalgia?: Authoritarian Nostalgia, Social Identity, And Political Behavior in Post-Authoritarian Democracies", University of Illinois, (2022). (Sanghoon, Voting for Nostalgia? ) One type of political nostalgia looks at a much more significant political change and disconnection in history: democratic transition. For some citizens, democratization is seen as a natural progression in the country's development. For others, such transition is perceived as discontinuity. Those individuals with more favorable views of the authoritarian past may feel nostalgia for the former dictatorship in the post-authoritarian context.⁶Sanghoon, Voting for Nostalgia?

Authoritarian nostalgia points out some values that were once fulfilled in the past but are no longer upheld in the context of democratization. These values often include economic prosperity, social stability, and national security. In many democratic transitions, the shift in priorities skewed toward institutional and constitutional consolidation of democracy instead of financial growth and security can be met with disillusionment by some citizens. Amid growing frustration with ineffective governments, they view the past dictatorship's achievements as even more impressive, particularly when contrasted with the challenges of the new democratic order. Rising social inequality, worsening economic conditions, persistent corruption, and the need to navigate new and often challenging conditions, such as political violence and terrorist attacks, can contribute to public dissatisfaction. The perceived absence of tangible improvements leads some to believe that the previous era was perhaps better after all.  This perception can also drive some individuals to yearn for a "firm hand" that can restore what is imagined having been the security and stability of the past.

In his classic, The Third Wave, Huntington identified public disillusionment as a significant trend among Third-Wave Democracies. The failure of the new democratic governments to address what he defines as "transition" and "contextual problems" generates feelings of indifference, disappointment, and disillusionment.⁷Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press,1993. (Huntington, The Third Wave ) Huntington identifies "transition problems," that emerge during the shift from authoritarian to democratic regimes, such as creating new constitutional and electoral systems, revising laws, and dismantling or reforming authoritarian institutions. He highlights that more enduring challenges to democratic consolidation arise from each country's unique "contextual problems", such as communal conflict, regional tensions, poverty, inequality, inflation, external debt, and low economic growth. When governments fail to address these issues, public disillusionment with democracy often grows, though discontent with a specific government does not necessarily mean the rejection of democracy itself. Huntington also warns that repeated cycles of hope during elections, followed by disappointment with the elected government and renewed hope, cannot continue indefinitely. Over time, this pattern invites broader frustration and disillusionment, ultimately threatening the long-term viability of democratic systems.

Disillusionment with the democratic transition and growing anxiety about the future pave the way for a resurgence of nostalgic feelings about past dictatorships. Various studies indicate the emergence of such feeling is encouraged by a general discontent with the democratic system’s performance, particularly in areas such as the rule of law,⁸Razal Rose and William Mishler, "Comparing Regime Support in Non-democratic and Democratic Countries", Democratization, (2010). the economy, public safety, and the provision of public services.⁹Alex Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Bridget Welsh, "Southeast Asia: Sources of Regime Support”, Journal of Democracy, (2013). Survey data on authoritarian nostalgia in Mongolia and the Philippines highlight that many East Asian democracies continue to grapple with "a haze of nostalgia for authoritarianism."¹⁰Yun-Han Chu, Yu-Tzung Chang, and Chong-Min Park, "The Democracy Barometers (Part I): Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia", Journal of Democracy, (2007). (Yun-han Chu, The Democracy Barometers). People are increasingly disillusioned by the gap between the promises of democracy and its actual outcomes. Many citizens feel that progress toward key democratic goals, such as the rule of law, and accountability, has been slow and insufficient. Some citizens often compare their lives under democracy with the growth-oriented authoritarianism of the past or with the prosperity experienced by non-democratic neighbors, particularly China.¹¹Yun-han Chu, The Democracy Barometers The economic and geopolitical rise of China over the last decade has tended to set the performance bar for democratic regimes in East Asia at an unreasonable height. Another study on the characteristics of authoritarian nostalgia, drawing on survey data from South Korea and Taiwan, revealed that economic prosperity enjoyed under former dictatorships is central to authoritarian nostalgia. Participants in this study often attributed economic success to strong leadership and social stability. Citizens have also shared assessments of former dictatorships that often emphasize their political and social achievements over their autocratic repression.¹²Sanghoon, Voting for Nostalgia? For instance, Lee Myung-bak won the 2007 presidential election by mobilizing the memory of South Korea’s economic miracle under Park Jung-hee’s leadership and pledging to revive the national economy.¹³Sanghoon, Voting for Nostalgia?

Authoritarian nostalgia cuts across generations and can be found among youth who did not experience the dictatorship firsthand.¹⁴Olena Nikolayenko, "Contextual effects on Historical Memory: Soviet nostalgia among post-Soviet adolescents", University of California Press, no. 2 (June 2008) ; Joakim Ekman and Jonas Linde, “Communist Nostalgia And The Consolidation Of Democracy In Central And Eastern Europe", The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, (2005); See Marsin Alshamary, Authoritarian Nostalgia Among Iraqi Youth: Roots and Repercussions, July 2018, available at https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/authoritarian-nostalgia-among-iraqi-youth-roots-and-repercussions/ (Marsin Alshamary, Authoritarian Nostalgia ) Youth are likely to have both higher expectations of democracy and less information about the costs of authoritarianism, which may lead to feelings of nostalgia.¹⁵Marsin Alshamary, Authoritarian Nostalgia. Lacking direct experience, they may develop biased views of political life under authoritarianism. When their expectations go unmet, frustration with democratic governance can lead them to view authoritarian alternatives more favorably. Research has revealed rising "communist nostalgia" in Central and Eastern Europe. The findings suggest that communist nostalgia is not only a result of political socialization under communism.¹⁶ Olena Nikolayenko, "Contextual effects on Historical Memory: Soviet nostalgia among post-Soviet adolescents", University of California Press, no. 2 (June 2008); Joakim Ekman and Jonas Linde, “Communist Nostalgia and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe" Among young respondents born after the collapse of the Soviet Union, communist nostalgia emerges as the result of distrust, disappointment, or a combination of both, in the democratic system's ability to produce socio-economic output.¹⁷Joakim Ekman and Jonas Linde, Communist Nostalgia. Similarly, in sub-Saharan democratizing countries, like Mozambique, Mali, and Madagascar, it is primarily the youth who are more supportive of authoritarianism, particularly because they have not experienced authoritarian constraints.¹⁸David Ifkovits, Children of Democracy? How Socialization Affects Individual Support For Democracy, July 2017, available at http://dropbox.com/scl/fi/u663s29csgpl3h9z76znz/ifkovits_childrenofdemocracy.pdf?rlkey=yft1ds6tkeagxegs3fixk0jq6&e=1&dl=0 (David, Children Of Democracy? ) In Tunisia, there is also a sense of nostalgia that views Ben Ali as a strongman who cared for the poor while primarily oppressing the wealthy, ensuring decent living conditions for the "zwewla" (the poor).¹⁹Lakhal and Jmal, Tunisian Youth Perceptions. Another common belief is that the generation that lived under the dictatorship was the "golden" and "prosperous" generation, considering that period as one of comfort, marked by stability and safety. While these perspectives are biased, they reflect the values the youth hoped to attain during the democratic transition.

3. (Un)breaking with the Past: Tracing the Roots of Authoritarian Nostalgia in Tunisia

3.1 An Illusionary Stability: The Mythology of Ben Ali’s Economy

Tunisia had long been viewed as a stable and unremarkable country that drew little interest from researchers. Jocelyne Dakhlia describes it as "Le Pays Sans Bruit" (Noise-free country) in her book on the Tunisian revolution.²⁰Jocelyne Dakhlia, Tunisie : le pays sans bruit, Actes Sud, 2011. Ben Ali's dictatorship meticulously crafted this external image while adopting strategies of "authoritarian upgrading".²¹The process by which authoritarian regimes undertake controlled reforms and adopt selective liberalization measures to maintain their rule, co-opt opposition, and adapt to changing domestic and international pressures, while preserving authoritarian power structures. For years, Tunisia's financial partners, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union, projected an image of an economic "miracle" performed by the Tunisian government. However, the revolution has revealed a dark side, marked by unemployment, limited access to the labor market, income inequalities, and significant regional disparities.²²Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle, "The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali," Mediterranean Politics, (2012).

Economic reforms were only desirable as long as they did not undermine the country’s stability and the regime’s power. In the 1990s, Tunisia implemented advanced market-oriented policies as part of economic reforms supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These reforms were part of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which aimed to open the economy, reduce government intervention, and encourage private sector growth. This new economic approach was paired with innovative social protection measures aimed at lessening the negative impacts of SAP on the lower and middle classes.²³Evrim Görmüş and Emel Akçalı, "Variegated Forms of Embeddedness: Home-Grown Neoliberal Authoritarianism in Tunisia Under Ben Ali," Journal of International Relations and Development, (2020). (Evrim, Variegated forms of embeddedness )

Introducing social protection institutions such as The Tunisian Solidarity Bank and the National Employment Fund led to greater state involvement and oversight in both the political and economic spheres. The tacit social contract between the regime and the Tunisian people rested upon political repression in exchange for social benefits. Such institutions created clientelistic relationships with vulnerable groups in society primarily through social transfers. These transfers were payments or benefits provided to individuals or groups in exchange for their support and loyalty. Using the mechanism of authoritarian bargain represented an informal agreement between the state and society where economic benefits were often traded for political loyalty.²⁴Evrim, Variegated forms of embeddedness. In so doing, the state strengthened its influence over these groups, making them reliant on the government's assistance.

Ben Ali was keen on making his economic reforms not only palpable to the lower classes but also for the middle classes. For the urban middle class, the thriving economy was reflected in individual financial success and reaching a decent standard of living. The rise of consumerism along with the facilitation of credit enabled many Tunisian families to expand their purchasing power. As Baccar Gherib notes: "The middle classes are omnipresent in political discourses. They represented, in effect, an essential piece of the rhetoric of Ben Ali’s regime in his strategy of self-legitimation."²⁵George Joffé, Routledge Handbook on the Modern Maghrib, Routledge, 2023. The continued expansion of the middle classes was synonymous with the stability and homogeneity of Ben Ali’ regime. The regime made sure that the well-being of this segment of society was instrumental to the image of his rule.

As political repression intensified and economic challenges mounted, the regime increased its efforts to manufacture stability and promote Tunisia's image as a progressive and crime-free country, domestically and internationally. The international acknowledgment of the Tunisian "economic miracle" was crucial in sustaining the Tunisian government's authority. The wide dissemination of such discourse from foreign allies also enhanced Tunisia's global reputation, facilitated the attraction of financial aid, and, most significantly, bolstered the government's legitimacy domestically. A key part of this narrative was the image of Tunisia as a safe country where crime was almost absent under Ben Ali’s strong rule. But this sense of safety was built on an apparatus of surveillance and state propaganda. Behind the myth of Tunisia’s success story, a vicious police state was operating that weighed heavily on dissidents and everyday Tunisians.

The Ben Ali dictatorship carefully built an image of his rule as a source of security, stability, and economic growth by relying on authoritarian upgrading, a strong police state, state propaganda, and unwavering support from international actors who turned a blind eye to the crimes of the regime. However, his legacy still evokes a proud claim to a mythical past ingrained in the Tunisian imagination, in which many did not have the proper chance to learn about its brutal repression. Today, many young people still describe his era as "Amn w Amen" (safety and security), oblivious to the reality of his dictatorship that should have been common knowledge after the revolution, particularly with the transitional justice process. His authoritarian legacy remains like a stubborn wound that refuses to heal.

3.2 The Black Decade: Tunisia’s Struggle for Democracy

The democratic transition in Tunisia was characterized by a cacophonous process, including economic stagnation, political fragmentation, and social unrest. The term "3ashriya Sawada" (black decade) began as an expression of frustration but gradually evolved into a defining narrative of the transition. Over time, many Tunisians began to view this period as one marked by failure rather than progress. The disillusionment with the transition, coupled with the enduring influence of authoritarian legacies, has fueled the rise of nostalgic rhetoric in politics.

Despite important milestones in the transition to democracy, the economy has been in turmoil, with soaring unemployment rates, a widening trade deficit, and a rapidly devaluing national currency. Socio-economic justice is way out of reach, although economic demands preceded political slogans during the Tunisian revolution. Protesters primarily called for improved living conditions, with the slogan "Employment, Freedom, Dignity," emerging as a powerful symbol of the grievances in Tunisia’s marginalized regions. In 2011, 72% of Tunisians believed the revolution was beneficial for their country, but by 2014, this number dropped to 31%, with the concerns about the economy remaining their top concern.²⁶Andrea Teti, Pamela Abbott, and Francesco Cavatorta, The Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia Social, Political and Economic Transformations, Routledge handbook of Mediterranean politics, 2018.

Beyond economic stagnation, Tunisia’s democratic transition was undermined by political instability. Widespread popular disillusionment of the political elite has persisted post-2011. The political scene was characterized by a central cleavage between Ennahdha, a religious conservative camp, and Nidaa Tounes, representatives of a "modernist" view focusing on preserving the secular nature of the post-colonial Tunisian state. The divide was exacerbated by the assassinations of two leftist politicians, Chokri Belaid, in February 2013, and Mohammed Brahmi, in July of the same year. Political clashes between Islamist and secular forces escalated, leading to a fragile compromise around the 2014 Constitution. The consensus helped Tunisia’s democracy progress and brought international recognition. It also weakened the ability of major parties to represent their supporters effectively as political competition lost its substance.²⁷Kevin Koehler, "Breakdown by Disengagement: Tunisia’s Transition from Representative Democracy", Political Research Exchange, no.5 (2023) (Kevin Koehler, Breakdown by Disengagement ) In addition, the governments emerging from the 2014 elite compromise proved unable to address the root causes of the country’s economic malaise. Therefore, many Tunisians began to disengage from conventional politics.²⁸Kevin Koehler, Breakdown by Disengagement.

In parallel, figures from Ben Ali's regime successfully organized within political parties. While Essebsi established Nidaa Tounes and brought together several former figures from the old regime under a Bourguibist umbrella, Abir Moussi, the former Deputy Secretary General of the now-dissolved Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), Ben Ali's ruling party, founded the Free Destourian Party (FDP), openly calling for restoration. Parties like Nidaa Tounes and the FDP exploited the political significance of authoritarian nostalgia to gain legitimacy and electoral support by embracing and leveraging the legacies of Ben Ali and Bourguiba. Both parties drew on the past achievements of economic prosperity, policy promises, and national security, contrasting them against the challenges of democratization, which were marked by an economic crisis, political instability, terrorism, and widespread corruption. The democratic transition was fragile, as the new governance system struggled to establish stability, while authoritarian structures and practices remained surprisingly resilient. On the one hand, Tunisians saw little real progress on the issues that had sparked the 2011 revolution. On the other hand, many of the same old elites have remained and brought back the authoritarian practices they embodied. Terrorist attacks and oppressive practices, including arbitrary arrests of protesters, police brutality, and the surveillance of dissenting voices, persisted following democratization.²⁹Cimini Giulia, Authoritarian Nostalgia and Practices in Newly Democratising Contexts: The Localised Example of Tunisia, Edinburgh University Press,2022. (Cimini, Authoritarian Nostalgia)Cimini, Authoritarian Nostalgia. This environment has allowed nostalgic rhetoric to grow alongside narrow nationalism and illiberal stances.³⁰Cimini, Authoritarian Nostalgia.

Tunisia is not the only country that has experienced authoritarian nostalgia. However, the unclear break with the legacies of the past has made it particularly vulnerable, as the lingering influence of former regimes continues to shape political discourse and public sentiment. Over the years, many Tunisians have continued to adhere to the narrative that the country needs a strongman as a viable solution to solve its problems, believing a "firm hand" could restore what they feel is lacking in the present. This can be partially reflected in the support that some Tunisians provided for Kais Said’s coup, celebrating the man who is seeking to save the country from a triple economic, political, and health crisis (COVID-19). This narrative continues to influence the Tunisian population. More recently, data from Afrobarometer have revealed a noticeable shift in public opinion, with a significant decline in the rejection of dictatorship from 78 percent in 2013 to 48 percent in 2024. Similarly, the preference for democracy over any other system has dropped from 71 percent to 54 percent over the same period.³¹Afrobarometer, "La démocratie en Tunisie | Le point de vue du peuple", June 2016, available at https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Tunisie-Democracy-scorecard-R10-Afrobarometer-24sept24.pdf The following data highlights that cynicism toward democracy is at its highest today as the country falls back into authoritarianism.

4. The Scope of Authoritarian Nostalgia: Understanding Its Outcomes

4.1 Authoritarian Nostalgia and the Role of Authoritarian Successor Parties: The Cases of Nidaa Tounes and the FDP

Nostalgia for the dictatorship era was not simply a popular feeling that "things were better under Ben Ali." On the one hand, the "fairy tale" perception of Tunisia under his rule was contrasted with the many difficulties of the democratic transition, leaving Tunisians disappointed with the current state of affairs.  On the other hand, certain political parties leveraged authoritarian nostalgia to appeal to their supporters' longing for the perceived stability and order of the past.

Nidaa Tounes and the Free Destourian Party (FDP) are examples of Authoritarian Successor Parties (ASPs). According to Loxton, these parties originate from authoritarian regimes but operate in a democratic system, often led by high-ranking former regime officials.³²James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, ed. Life After Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide, Cambridge University Press, 2018. (James Loxton, Life After Dictatorship). Abir Moussi founded the conservative, anti-Islamist, and ultra-nationalist FDP after serving as Deputy Secretary General of Ben Ali’s dissolved Democratic Constitutional Rally. Nidaa Tounes was created in 2012 by Essebsi, a former official under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Like other ASPs, both parties built their support by invoking and embracing the legacies of dictatorships. They contributed to authoritarian regression, preserved elements of the old regime, and obstructed transitional justice.³³James Loxton, Life After Dictatorship.

ASPs adopt specific strategies to embrace the authoritarian past since the electorate typically disapproves of their origins and may be reluctant to support them. They rely on two key elements: authoritarian baggage and authoritarian inheritance.³⁴James Loxton, Life After Dictatorship. The authoritarian inheritance refers to the assets that parties inherit from an authoritarian regime, which can be leveraged for electoral success. They can be material resources, political experience and formation, clientelistic networks, and a record of achievements. Meanwhile, authoritarian baggage is the liabilities these ASPs carry from the past, potentially ruining their electoral prospects, including human rights violations, and corruption.³⁵James Loxton, Life After Dictatorship. To gain support, party leaders must find ways to reduce the drawbacks of their authoritarian baggage while maximizing the advantages of their authoritarian inheritance.

Moussi emphasized the authoritarian inheritance by portraying Ben Ali's rule as decades of "stability" while minimizing the regime's wrongdoings. She built her party brand around his achievements, including economic growth, national security, and order, particularly as the new democracy's performance was seen as disappointing in these areas. She constantly vowed to bring back these lost values. She promised to tackle terrorism, revive the economy, and foster political stability.³⁶Anne Wolf, The Counterrevolution Gains Momentum in Tunisia: The Rise of Abir Moussi, November 2020, available at https://mideastdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/201118b_WolfSnapshot.pdf This narrative resonated well with other ex-regime nostalgics and other citizens whose hopes for a better life under democracy remained unfulfilled. Moussi's approach to embracing the past relied on the mythologized legacy of Ben Ali’s regime, which strengthened her party's appeal among many Tunisians.

Beyond her anti-Islamist agenda, Moussi supported a range of policies that threatened Tunisia's fragile political balance and were reminiscent of Ben Ali's dictatorship. Her party supported a draft law seeking to expand legal protections for domestic security forces and customs officers in 2015. Moussi has effectively positioned herself as a political advocate for the police unions. Her unwavering support for these unions, coupled with her party's dedication to upholding a strong police apparatus, signals a return to strategies from the previous regime, where the police were viewed as "a symbol of corruption, repression, and nepotism, essentially, a symbol of the regime itself."³⁷Cimini, Authoritarian Nostalgia.

Nidaa Tounes took a different approach than the FDP in embracing the legacies of the past. Their strategy involved distinguishing between a "good" dictator, whom the party embraced, and a "bad" dictator, whom it denounced. Although the party acknowledged the ugly aspects of the former regimes, it blamed them entirely on the "bad" dictator.³⁸James Loxton, Life After Dictatorship. Essebsi sought to distance himself from the disgraced Ben Ali, while his party openly embraced the legacy of Bourguiba. To highlight its connection to "Bourguibism," Essebsi launched his victorious 2014 presidential campaign before Bourguiba's mausoleum. The Bourguiba nostalgia was at the core of Nidaa 's political campaigning. They glorified his "mythology" to legitimize their claims to power. They championed his discourse on "modernity" and claimed it as a continuous tradition passed on to them. They also considered themselves as the only protector of this legacy against the threats of the Islamists. Hence, they represent what they consider the "true" and "authentic" Tunisian identity.³⁹Mathilde Zederman, "Construction nationale et mémoire collective : islamisme et bourguibisme en Tunisie (1956-2014)," Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, no.3 (2015).

Although Nidaa distanced themselves from Ben Ali’s dictatorship, they still relied on his authoritarian inheritance. The party reunited several "azlems" (old-regime figures) and inherited extensive pre-existing networks that spilled over from the authoritarian period. They represented important assets that provided the party with financial and political influence. In return, Essebsi's call to end "digging in the wounds of the past and move on,"⁴⁰Mariam Salehi, Transitional Justice in Process: Plans and politics in Tunisia, Manchester University Press, 2022. (Salehi, Transitional Justice in Process). which endeared him to these senior figures from the Ben Ali regime, was a clear indication of his unwillingness to deal with the authoritarian legacy of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali. It is important to consider that such actions, while not explicitly authoritarian, have contributed to fostering a broad sense of impunity for the elites and institutions of the old regime, thereby hindering transitional justice efforts.

As ASPs, both FDP and Nidaa Tounes embraced, loudly and proudly, the accomplishments of the former regimes and emphasized the contrast between the supposedly ideal state of affairs when that previous regime was in place versus the dysfunctions of the democratization process. The Ben Ali era became associated with strong leadership and "stability," Bourguiba's rule was defined only by his anti-colonialism fight and modernizing efforts. The figure of an authoritarian leader often gains appeal in times of instability, evoking admiration and nostalgia as some Tunisians hope for a strong leader who" gets things done." However, the survival and reconversion of an important part of the authoritarian political elite and bureaucracy have had significant repercussions on the democratic transition, which provided Tunisia with an elite whose loyalty to the new democratic regime was questionable. Both parties illustrate the shortcomings of an unclear break with the institutions and politics of the days of dictatorship, contributing to authoritarian backsliding and obstructing transitional justice.

4.2 Transitional Justice and Democratization Nexus: A Missed Opportunity

4.2.1 Internal and External Factors: The Limitations of the TDC Impact in Tunisia

Tunisia’s efforts at truth-seeking and memory preservation were limited, allowing authoritarian nostalgia to take root. While the transitional justice process in Tunisia was tasked with establishing what happened and who was responsible for past abuses, and with pursuing goals such as truth-seeking, memory preservation, and accountability, its impact was short-lived due to political, structural, and institutional challenges. Public support for, and engagement with, the transitional justice process was also limited. The Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) missed a crucial opportunity to connect with the public, especially young people, in meaningful ways that could have encouraged critical reflection on their understanding of the authoritarian legacies. This section will deal with the limitations of the TDC, focusing on the overburdening of the Commission, the internal friction within it, and the political nature of the transitional justice project.

• Internal factors

In December 2013, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) of Tunisia adopted the Organic Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice Law (TJ Law). The TJ Law allowed the creation of the TDC to investigate and expose human rights abuses from 1955 up to 2013. On 24 June 2020, the TDC’s final report was finally published, six years after the Commission began its work. The TJ process suffered from significant limitations internally and externally which impacted on the work of the Commission reaching its goals.

The TDC is the institution where we can best observe the mismatch between expectations and capacities. In its mandate to address almost 60 years of repressive rule and human rights violations, the TDC investigated human rights abuses, including civil and political rights violations, as well as vote rigging, corruption, embezzlement, forced migration, etc. Including economic crimes was an important innovation and addressed the issues of unemployment, corruption, and economic marginalization that partly drove the revolution.⁴¹Salehi, Transitional Justice in Process. However, it was a very ambitious mandate, supported by international transitional justice professionals and domestic partners. The holistic approach to the transitional justice process was not necessarily the most suitable for the Tunisian case. Transitional justice practitioners overlooked the limited capacity of the newly established political and transitional justice institutions, which slowly became overburdened with the work they aspired to complete especially without sustained political support.⁴²Mariem Salehi, "Trying Just Enough or Promising Too Much? The Problem-Capacity-Nexus in Tunisia's Transitional Justice Process," Journal of Intervention and State building, (2016). For instance, TDC indicated in its final report that it received a large number of complaints with issues related to corruption from both public and governmental institutions. However, it declared there was not enough time to investigate all of them. Although the TDC was able to carry out arbitration procedures and a public hearing on corruption, it was not able to conduct other key tasks, most importantly the investigation of corruption cases for prosecution in the Specialized Criminal Chambers.⁴³See ICTJ, The Truth About Corruption Reviewing the Tunisia Truth and Dignity Commission's Report on Corruption Under Dictatorship, February 2024, available at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/ictj_briefing_tunisia_corruption_en_web_0.pdf. (ICTJ, The Truth About Corruption )

There were internal problems throughout the TDC’s mandate, including power struggles among the commissioners and accusations of undemocratic leadership.⁴⁴ICTJ, The Truth About Corruption. These internal frictions slowed down its consolidation, leading to a perception of a further delay in transitional justice activities. The TDC began with 15 truth commissioners, some of whom immediately resigned without ultimately being replaced. This influenced its future operations as well as the public’s perception of its performance.

• External Factors

The political landscape in which the TDC was to perform its work was far from ideal. Attempts to ease political tensions and promote compromise significantly influenced the decision to abandon the original vision of the transitional justice process.

With many old-regime figures back as elected MPs, as well as Ennahdha’s participation in so-called "national unity governments," support for the transitional justice project as it had been passed by the NCA faded. With the possibility to open investigations against politicians and businessmen and construct alternative visions of Tunisia’s past, the TDC posed a challenge to Nidaa Tounes, which benefited from obstructing the transitional justice process. President Essebsi’s attitude toward the TJ process could be summarized in one statement: “We must leave the dead alone.”⁴⁵Salehi, Transitional Justice in Process. He started to oppose the TDC, questioning its neutrality. His party voiced intense hostility toward the TDC, using anti-Islamist rhetoric and accusing it of being a political agent of Ennahdha. The victims of past abuses were being grouped and seen as supporting one political camp over another. They were perceived as political players. This discourse compromised not only the work of the Commission but also how the population viewed the victims.⁴⁶Yasmine Jamal Hajar, The Tunisian Truth and Dignity Commission: From a Human Rights to a Political Project, April 2019, available at https://www.boell.de/en/2019/04/03/tunisian-truth-and-dignity-commission-human-rights-political-project ( Yasmine, The Tunisian Truth).

The hostilities continued by obstructing the TDC's access to the archives of the presidency and interior ministry, accusing it of partisan loyalties, and constructing parallel political and legal channels of transitional justice.⁴⁷Joshua E. Riggs, "Why don't I forgive? They didn't ask for forgiveness!": Manich Msamah and Tunisia's Politics of Unforgiveness, Cambridge University Press, (2022). (Joshua E., Why don't I forgive? ) This was evident in the 2015 Economic Reconciliation Bill (later renamed the Administrative Reconciliation Act), which proposed to forgive economic crimes and corruption committed by civil servants and businessmen under the previous authoritarian regimes in exchange for closed-door confession and paybacks.⁴⁸See The Middle East Institute, “The revolution in Tunisia continues”, September 2016, available at https://www.mei.edu/publications/revolution-tunisia-continues

The logic behind economic reconciliation was described as a project that "seeks to achieve accelerated transitional justice, specific and appropriate to economic issues."⁴⁹Joshua E., Why don't I forgive? On various occasions, Essebsi insisted on calling for “national reconciliation” among all Tunisians. There was a strong emphasis on the language of reconciliation using it in a sense that implies there was no further need to pursue transitional justice. Reconciliation was sometimes discursively used by political actors in order to suppress quests for change and accountability.⁵⁰Joshua E., Why don't I forgive? Ennahdha was somehow ambivalent about the law. Its support for transitional justice has not been linear. Ironically, Ennahdha had initially had an interest in seeking accountability but later started collaborating with those they had wanted to see held to account and slowly abandoned pursuing accountability to secure its political interests and alliances. Ennahdha sought to limit the impact of the TDC after being accused of political violence by the independent Commission Defending Brahmi and Belaid, which had been initiated by members of the opposition parties, The Popular Front in particular, to investigate the assassinations of the two leftist politicians in 2013. At the same time, Essebsi repeatedly stated his willingness to take legal action based on the Commission’s findings, especially when tensions with Ennahdha were high. In response, Ennahdha shifted its position on transitional justice from calling for criminal persecution of the human rights violators under the ex-regimes to a plea for general reconciliation.⁵¹Yasmine, The Tunisian Truth.

Although an amended version of the Reconciliation Law was eventually adopted by the Assembly of Representatives in September 2017, the Bill did not go unchallenged. The Manish M'sameh (I Won't Forget) social movement viewed it as signaling a renewed alliance between the old-regime figures and the state. They also opposed the efforts of political elites to force a sense of reconciliation and unity instead of pursuing accountability. They built a campaign where they organized more than eighty protests and demonstrations, on top of various petition signings, seminars, press conferences, media appearances, and cultural events to oppose the Bill and its various iterations.

The TDC faced significant internal challenges, including conflicts among its commissioners and being overwhelmed by its holistic approach. However, its main hurdle was the politicization of its work. Its role shifted from a constitutional mechanism to a political tool, largely due to the power struggle between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahdha. Essebsi reluctance to fully engage in transitional justice processes allowed him to maintain a system that favored the elites and power structures of the past but also prevented society from fully breaking away from its authoritarian past. The undermining of the transitional justice process continued beyond the passing of the administrative reconciliation law. It manifested in the government’s inaction and delaying tactics, such as not publishing the TDC’s final report, not enforcing the presence of the accused at the trials of the specialized chambers, and delays in setting up the Dignity Fund.⁵²Salehi, Transitional Justice in Process. Memorialization initiatives were also limited in both number and scope.

4.2.2 Truth-Seeking and Memory Preservation: Falling Short and Enabling Authoritarian Nostalgia

Despite the setbacks the TDC met in Tunisia, the truth-seeking process has resulted in a significant collection of testimonies, reports, and recommendations. However, its ability to shape collective memory and challenge nostalgia for authoritarianism has largely been unfulfilled due to the lack of subsequent institutional actions, such as prosecutions, reparations, memorialization, or education reforms. For instance, public hearings provided an important insight into past atrocities, and some efforts for memorialization occurred. Nonetheless, many young Tunisians are still unaware of historical injustices. The government's failure to update educational curricula has restricted the younger generation's access to accurate historical accounts. This highlights the need to reflect on missed opportunities to promote truth-seeking and memory preservation in Tunisia, particularly through the limited outreach of public hearings and the complete absence of educational reform.

• Public Hearings: Missing Outreach Strategy

The TDC and the Tunisian state failed to fully comply with the memory preservation mandate outlined in the transitional justice law. The lack of full commitment to these objectives hindered efforts to solidify the truth-seeking process. In Article 1, the TJ Law mentions the importance of preserving and archiving collective memory. It details in Article 44 that the TDC is responsible for uncovering the truth, ensuring accountability, and promoting memory preservation. Its role is to "take all the measures" and "carry out the necessary activities"  and, at the end of its work, "entrusts all of its documents and records to the National Archives or to a preservation institution of national memory created for this purpose"⁵³See OHCHR, Organic Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/TN/TransitionalJusticeTunisia.pdf ( OHCHR, Organic Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice ) The same goes for the state's role, as outlined in Article 5 of the TJ Law, which states that memory preservation is "a duty that the state and all its institutions or those under its supervision should carry out to learn lessons from the past and commemorate the victims."⁵⁴OHCHR, Organic Law on Establishing and Organizing Transitional Justice. However, in both cases, the law has not asserted the scope of this "preservation" or the sanctions for failing to implement them.

Due to internal challenges, the TDC directed its communication strategy to mitigate damage to its public image. Adverse media scrutiny and the intense political landscape made it difficult for the Commission to build a clear outreach strategy to increase public engagement during public hearings and beyond. The TDC's public hearings took place at the end of 2016, as a symbolic and collective act of remembrance. They captured the public's attention, mainly through victim’s testimonies that revealed the reality of state violence and human rights abuses. The first public hearings were live streamed on national television and available online in different languages. Over the following months, several public hearings took place nationwide. Some sessions focused on issues like sexual violence, online activism, and corruption. By addressing a broad spectrum of violations and involving victims from different generations and ideological backgrounds, the TDC’s public hearings engaged diverse segments of Tunisian society and allowed for greater public awareness of the injustices committed.

Despite the initial success of the public hearings, momentum faded, and activities related to memory preservation took a backseat during the remaining period of the TDC's work, especially since the scope of what "preservation" means was not specified in the TJ Law. Memory efforts also weakened as political tensions persisted.   Efforts to engage the broader population – particularly youth – in learning about and reflecting on Tunisia's dark history were lacking. This challenge exposed the TDC's lack of a clear and intentional outreach strategy during and beyond the public hearings. In this context, outreach refers to a combination of tools, materials, and activities that a truth commission uses to establish direct communication with affected communities and extend the burden of the responsibility to the general public to join a space of reflection. It is a two-way process: While the TDC shares information, it also opens a space for public feedback and participation. Essentially, public support and interest in the truth-seeking processes cannot be taken for granted.

Public hearings in Tunisia were an important opportunity to confront its painful past – the ability of victims to share their testimonies and be officially acknowledged. Yet, the TDC failed to prioritize effective outreach strategies, leaving the public as just a passive viewer at such an important event. What was missing was a more participatory transitional justice mechanism that relied on the active engagement of groups and individuals mobilizing for justice. Youth-led and bottom-up efforts should complement official TJ mechanisms, yet the TDC missed the chance to include young people in its truth-seeking process and foster a more critical understanding of the legacies of the past. Without a proper understanding of the dictatorship's legacy, the younger generation is more susceptible to falling into the trap of authoritarian nostalgia.

• Ignoring the Past: The Lack of Educational Reform in Tunisia

Educational reform went unheeded after the TDC published its final report. A key recommendation was to integrate Tunisia's history of human rights violations into the curricula, which the Minister of Education has yet to implement. Reforming the education system requires significant political and financial investment and, even under the best circumstances, a great deal of time. This lack of prioritization is an important indicator of the government's reluctance to fully engage with the recognition and non-repetition of the past.

The role of the TDC in advocating for educational reform was also weak. Transitional justice commissions like the TDC are typically temporary, and the end of their mandate means they may not have full control to ensure that their final report's findings are well-disseminated, and their recommendations are properly implemented. It is crucial to consider what will happen when their mandate ends and how to extend the impact of their work beyond that point. In many cases, commissions plan "legacy programs" in advance that will be implemented after the end of their mandate, often through partnerships with civil society and government institutions.⁵⁵Clara, Making an Impact. Unfortunately, the TDC did not establish relationships with the education sector and civil society to sustain the work of memory preservation after its mandate was complete.

Following the shift toward consensus-based politics in 2013, the governance model prioritized stability and reduced division by focusing on national unity. This approach extended to the education sector as the Ministry of Education decided not to revise the curriculum to reflect the 2011 revolution and Tunisia's democratic transition without a unified narrative. Students continue to receive the same civics education as during the Ben Ali regime. Meanwhile, some teachers rely on individual efforts to address the revolution and its aftermath based on their perspectives.⁵⁶Sarah Anne Rennick, "Losing support to democracy: Political socialization, popular conceptualizations, and the formation of political grievances among marginalized youth in Tunisia," Mediterranean Politics, (2023).

In this case, Tunisian history textbooks also continue to propagate the same outlook of the past even after the revolution, which is the case in Bourguiba's biased portrayal. Bourguiba is mentioned sporadically in lessons focused on the struggle for independence and the state-building process following 1956.⁵⁷Simon Robins and Paul Gready, ed. Transitional Justice in Tunisia Innovations, Continuities, Challenges, Routledge, 2023 (Simon, Transitional Justice in Tunisia). A one-sided narrative described him as the sole architect of Tunisia's success, emphasizing his role as a strongman who alone achieved progress, overlooking the repression and systematic persecution faced by his opponents. Different measures Essebsi imposed reflect an effort to further reinforce Bourguiba's legacy in the public sphere. This includes the policy mandating that teachers spend an hour on 6 April discussing Bourguiba to mark the anniversary of his death. ⁵⁸Simon, Transitional Justice in Tunisia.

Education has a vital role in helping young people come to terms with an abusive past. It enables them to examine history and its lasting impact on the present. During authoritarianism, the manipulation and distortion of textbooks became a tool to legitimize repression and reinforce narratives that were beneficial to the regime. This was the case in Tunisia. For example, Bourguiba's portrayal in textbooks was ambivalent and biased, leaving an ambiguous image of his legacy in Tunisians' collective memory, especially that of the youth. Political parties and elites capitalized on these memory gaps to craft a narrative that suited their agenda, often invoking authoritarian nostalgia. The absence of educational reforms was intentional, as policymakers and political elites largely avoided reforming the textbooks. The lack of political will to address the past aligned with their interests, as confronting the truth would challenge the narratives they seek to promote.

5. Reflections and Conclusions

The democratic transition opened a Pandora’s box of unexpected challenges. The complexity of the transition, its successes, failures, promises, and disappointments, led many to feel nostalgic for an idealized version of the past. As Reed aptly notes, “Nostalgia for then does not and cannot exist unless in dialogue with a deeply unsatisfactory now.”⁵⁹Amber R. Reed, Nostalgia After Apartheid: Disillusionment, Youth, and Democracy in South Africa, Notre Dame University Press,2020. (Amber, Nostalgia After Apartheid).   Authoritarian nostalgia serves as a "coping mechanism" in the face of major economic, social, and political upheavals, reflecting a desire for predictability, stability, and control. However, it often glosses over the darker aspects of the past. Sensationalized political narratives may have had an important influence in shaping such nostalgic perspectives among some Tunisians.

Some young people who were not yet adults before 2011 may view previous dictatorships as the "good old days." Their perceptions of the past are heavily influenced by their present experiences and the current performance of the government and its institutions. Indeed, while working on democratic transition in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ifkovits demonstrated that youth may claim to support authoritarianism because they did not live under it. And because they have not experienced authoritarianism, they are likely to have both higher expectations of democracy and less information about the costs of authoritarianism.⁶⁰David, Children of Democracy? The same goes for Tunisian youth, who, disillusioned by a democratic transition that failed to deliver the security, stability, and economic prosperity they had hoped for, feel let down by the promises of democracy and may look favorably upon the past dictatorship – an oppressive system that many never had the opportunity to fully learn about.

The challenge is how to forge unifying, pragmatic but also pluralistic narratives that can acknowledge the past without it becoming a trap, while also looking toward the future with an awareness of both past errors and accomplishments. This dilemma is where the role of transitional justice could have been crucial. Truth-seeking and memory-preservation efforts are indeed an essential opportunity for many countries to confront their painful past and learn from it as a guarantee of non-repetition. It is important to document the testimonies of victims and their families, hold those responsible to account, as well as challenge the systems of power and privilege that contributed to the violations.

Although Tunisia’s approach to transitional justice was carefully planned and internationally commended for being inclusive and comprehensive, the newly established political and transitional justice institutions were overburdened by the amount of work they had to do in line with the holistic approach. With further shifts in power and political preferences, the TDC increasingly faced challenges from the political sphere, undermining its authority. Slowly, the goal of accountability was increasingly abandoned in favor of political agendas. In addition, internal friction between TDC members themselves also hindered their performance and the image of the Commission.⁶¹Salehi, Transitional Justice in Process. While the TDC was able to reach some milestones despite the harsh political and media scrutiny, including the implementation of public hearings, and the publishing of the final report, among others, it failed to raise public awareness and facilitate a process where citizens and young people reconsider their roles toward structural inequalities and legacies of violence that continue to exist today.

The construction of nostalgia is always built upon the back of its opposite, forgetting.⁶²Amber, Nostalgia After Apartheid. Tunisia finds itself trapped in a "rough, cacophonous rhyme,"⁶³Carlos Varón González, Past Dictators Never Die, September 2021, available at https://www.publicbooks.org/past-dictators-never-die/ where it echoes the very past it seeks to escape. While there is no agreement on how best to confront the past, there is a shared recognition that the legacies of authoritarianism cannot be simply swept under the rug. The truncated transitional justice process, which was limited by a range of factors, including political expediency, allowed false narratives about the authoritarian regime to flourish in public perception and be perpetuated by key political elites, and this, in turn, created a threat to democratic consolidation that has become evident in the current state of affairs.